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This article has two goals. First, I want
to respond to concerns voiced by Ruby
(2013). Since these concerns are not lim-
ited to Ruby, they provide an opportunity
to address the issues she raises for a broad
audience of neuroscientists. Second, and
related to my first goal, I want to alert
investigators who are familiar only with
our neuropsychological investigations of
self-knowledge to our earlier work on
model construction. A familiarity with this
foundational research can help avert con-
cerns and issues likely to arise if one is
aware only of neuropsychological exten-
sions of our work.
RUBY’S CONCERNS
In a recent article in this journal, Ruby
(2013) proposed that cognitive neuro-
science may provide theoretical grounding
for many tenets of Psychoanalytic Theory.
For example, neuroscience may help situ-
ate unconscious memories of experienced
events (UMEEs)—which play a critical
role in psychoanalysis—in a more scientif-
ically respectable context.
I have no wish to debate the merit of
Ruby’s thesis. I do, however, take issue
with some of the “evidence” she marshals
in its support. Specifically, a considerable
proportion of her paper laments the lack
of attention she feels has been accorded
to UMEEs in the investigations of trait
self-knowledge. This negative assessment
apparently was motivated by her read-
ing of Klein and Gangi (2010), a review
paper describing our attempts to extend
our work on trait self-knowledge to indi-
viduals suffering clinical dysfunction (e.g.,
amnesia, autism, dementia). I quote the
relevant sections of her paper:
“The consideration of UMEE has been
lacking for example in research inves-
tigating memory and the self, as illus-
trated by the article of Klein and Gangi
(2010). . . the authors aimed to bet-
ter understand the link between the
different types of self-related memory
systems, by investigating the representa-
tion of self-personality traits in patients
with amnesia. They report results show-
ing that some patients with episodic
amnesia . . . update the representation
of their own personality traits. For
Klein and Gangi, these cases showed
that episodic and semantic memory sys-
tems were separate and independent.
Interestingly, they also considered . . .
the possibility that UMEE may par-
ticipate in the updating of personal-
ity traits since they wrote “K.C. not
only had access to semantic knowledge
of his own personality traits, but he
was also able to acquire new knowledge
about his personality. Yet this updat-
ing occurred without his being able
to episodically recollect any informa-
tion about the behavioral events on
which this updating presumably was
based.” Unfortunately, the authors did
not develop this point and did not dis-
cuss the hypothesis of the updating of
personality traits based on the UMEE
. . . However, (their findings) do not
exclude the possibility that UMEE par-
ticipate in the formation of semantic
knowledge” (p. 2).
I believe Professor Ruby’s concerns can
be addressed by reference to the body of
work that served as the conceptual basis
for our later neuropsychological investi-
gations. Our argument that episodic and
semantic memory systems are (function-
ally) independent was not based on data
from our case studies. Rather it was based
on empirical work conducted with men-
tally healthy participants; only later did we
apply these findings and the model they
resulted in to patients suffering cognitive
impairments.
A MODEL OF TRAIT SELF-KNOWLEDGE
IN NON-CLINICAL POPULATIONS
The goal of our formative work was to
determine whether trait-relevant behav-
ioral exemplars play a role in trait judg-
ments about the self. To address this
question, we initiated a program of
research using cognitively and neurolog-
ically healthy individuals. Our patient
studies came later, after we already had
formulated and tested our model of trait
self-knowledge. The investigations of indi-
viduals with well-circumscribed cognitive
and neurological impairments seemed a
natural way to extend our initial findings
and refine our model.
Our non-clinical studies used a variety
of methodologies, procedures and con-
textual factors (e.g., self-at-home, self-at-
school) to examine the two most widely
adopted models of the mental represen-
tation of trait self-knowledge: The com-
putational model (i.e., trait judgments are
based on access to behavioral exemplars
in memory) and the abstraction model
(i.e., trait judgments are based on access
to pre-computed semantic summaries).
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Each model had advocates, but deciding
between them had proven difficult. Our
strategy was to adopt experimental meth-
ods that would enable us to pit these mod-
els against one another, thereby allowing
us to assess their respective merits.
Due to “length of text” constraints, I
focus on the results of our priming studies.
However, the reader should be aware that
to garner convergent support we employed
a variety of methods–e.g., transfer appro-
priate processing in recognition memory;
Dunn and Kirsner’s (1988) technique of
reversed association [reviewed in Klein
et al. (2008); Klein and Lax (2010)].
According to the logic of our priming
methodology, if trait judgments require
the activation of trait-relevant behav-
ioral exemplars in memory (regardless
of whether or not that activation results
in conscious awareness–see below), two
things should happen: (1) an initial
request to judge whether a trait is self-
relevant should prime (i.e., speed up)
the subsequent performance of a task
requiring participants to retrieve trait-
relevant exemplars from memory (since
exemplars already will have been acti-
vated by the judgment task), and (2) a
request to retrieve trait-relevant exem-
plars from memory should prime per-
formance of a subsequent trait judgment
task, since the retrieval task will have acti-
vated exemplars required to make a trait
judgment.
By contrast, if trait judgments are
based on semantic abstractions rather than
behavioral exemplars, then the activation
of exemplars will not play a part in the
judgment process. Accordingly, exemplar-
based priming should not be observed.
To cut to the chase, in over a dozen
studies we consistently found that–
except in certain, theoretically predicted
circumstances—priming did not occur.
We concluded that trait judgments typi-
cally are not based on either the conscious
or unconscious activation of behavioral
exemplars; rather—in accord with the
trait abstraction model—they appear to
depend on access to pre-computed trait
summaries in semantic memory.
As noted, priming was observed in
certain situations. However, these “excep-
tions to the rule” were predicted by
the abstraction model. Equally impor-
tant, these “exceptions” demonstrated that
our priming methodology was sufficiently
sensitive to detect trait-relevant behavioral
exemplars–whether conscious or not–
when exemplars were predicted, on the
basis of theory, to play a part in the judg-
ment process (for a review see Klein et al.,
2008).
With model in hand, we turned our
attention to patients suffering from neu-
ropsychological disorders to see whether
our theory could account for—and per-
haps provide insight into—impairments
of self-knowledge exhibited by individuals
suffering cognitive dysfunction (e.g., Klein
and Gangi, 2010).
QUESTIONS CONCERNING OUR
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL FINDINGS
LIKELY TO ARISE FROM A LACK OF
FAMILIARITY WITH THE
FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH
Since, with one exception, all of our non-
clinical research on self-knowledge was
published in social psychology journals,
many neuroscientists may not be aware
of the work that provided the empirical
and theoretical foundation for the model
we subsequently applied to clinical pop-
ulations. Our neuropsychological inves-
tigations of self-knowledge recently have
captured the interests of the neuroscience
community (e.g., Renoult et al., 2012;
Martinelli et al., 2013; Picard et al., 2013;
Prebble et al., 2013); therefore, it seems a
good time to direct attention to that ear-
lier body of work [a comprehensive sum-
mary can be found in Klein et al. (2008)].
Familiarity with this formative literature
may help to preempt misunderstandings
and address questions likely to arise when
one’s acquaintance with our model of self
is based primarily on what can be gleaned
from its neuropsychological applications.
For example, an appreciation of this
research reveals that we were very con-
cerned about the potential effects of
UMEEs on trait judgments. Accordingly,
we employed a variety of tasks that had
been shown not to require conscious
access to the content assumed to medi-
ate their successful performance. While
the findings thus far mentioned do not
directly address the possibility that UMEEs
play a role in the formation of semantic
summaries, data presented in a later sec-
tion of this article casts some doubt on that
hypothesis as well.
Our interest in the potential effects of
unconscious behavioral exemplars on the
trait judgment process is put in sharp relief
by Klein et al. (1992). While explaining
the logic of priming, we noted that this
technique “does not require that behav-
ioral exemplars be consciously retrieved to
exert an influence on subsequent task per-
formance. On the contrary, we share with
many exemplar theorists the view that the
effects of individual exemplars often will
be outside of conscious awareness . . . We
argue only that if in the process of per-
forming an initial task, behavioral memo-
ries are activated, these memories will be
more accessible for subsequent retrieval in
a trait judgment task than had they not
been activated.” (p. 743).
As noted, our research yielded a patch-
work of positive and null priming results
(e.g., Klein et al., 2008). Accounting for
these findings by appeal to UMEEs would
seem a daunting undertaking. A UMEE
account would have to explain “when and
why” priming occurred and “when and
why” it did not. It would have to accom-
modate a complex pattern of findings,
obtained with a broad range of experi-
mental conditions (including variations in
method, population, context and experi-
ence). Even if one held that UMEEs play
a role only in the formation of seman-
tic summaries, one still would need to
explain “when and why” those summaries
are formed–and thus, available for trait
judgments–in some situations but not in
others. Lacking a principled basis for pre-
dicting the full pattern of our results, an
advocate of UMEE theory would have
to remain open to the possibility that a
unique explanation might be required for
a number of our “seemingly” conflicting
findings.
By contrast, what appears to be an
erratic collection of outcomes can readily
be transformed into an orderly, predictable
and programmatic set of findings by
appeal to the abstraction model conjoined
with just two additional, theoretically-
motivated principles—i.e., episodic and
semantic memory are functionally inde-
pendent; the formation of trait-summaries
varies as a function of trait-relevant behav-
ioral experience. Of course, Occam’s razor
is a guiding principle, not a metaphys-
ical mandate. But, assuming that parsi-
mony is a desirable heuristic in theory
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construction, it is hard to see how a model
based on UMEEs can accommodate our
complete set of findings in as economical
a manner as the abstraction model.
In the text quoted above, Ruby raises
a second concern. How, she asks, can
amnesic patient K.C. update his trait self-
knowledge when he is unable to recol-
lect any information about the behavioral
events on which this updating presum-
ably is based? The most likely answer, in
her opinion, is that updating his seman-
tic trait-knowledge results from the acti-
vation of trait-relevant UMEEs. “How,”
she wonders, “could one otherwise explain
(these) results?” (p.2; parenthesis added
for clarification).
It turns out that our early work
speaks to Ruby’s puzzlement. Sherman
and Klein (1994) demonstrated that trait
updating occurs by processes occurring
at encoding—not by the activation (con-
scious or unconscious) of experiences
already in memory. Indeed, since in this
and other studies, we presented the trait-
relevant behavioral information on which
summaries presumably were based on-line
via computer, there was little opportunity
to access pre-stored UMEEs in memory1.
These findings fit nicely with Tulving’s
(1995) SPI model of memory, according to
which, information is stored in semantic
memory during initial processing—not as
the result of some serial process in which
content first is activated from episodic
memory and then converted to semantic
knowledge.
Thus, empirical and theoretical answers
to Ruby’s query (i.e., “how can our updat-
ing results be explained without recourse
to UMEEs?”) already exist. But one needs
to know where to look. The purpose of this
paper is to provide that guidance.
Further complicating matters for a
UMEE model of the updating process,
Klein and Gangi (2010) also reported the
case of K.R., a patient with Alzheimer’s
Dementia. In addition to seriously com-
promised episodic memory, K.R. showed
severe impairment in her ability to add
knowledge to semantic memory (as
often is the case in advanced stages of
1These studies examined the formation and represen-
tation of trait knowledge about an artificial “other”.
However, our work has shown that the same processes
operate whether the target is “self” or “other.”
dementia; e.g., Westmacott et al., 2004).
And,— as predicted by the abstrac-
tion model—absent the ability to update
semantic memory, K.R. should be inca-
pable of updating her trait self-knowledge
to accommodate changes in her personal-
ity wrought by dementia. This is exactly
what we (and others) found (e.g., Klein
et al., 2003).
By contrast, K.C.’s semantic memory is
essentially uncompromised (e.g., Tulving
et al., 1991; Tulving, 1993). Accordingly,
his trait updating abilities–as predicted by
our model–remain largely intact despite
severe episodic amnesia. Considering all
of the evidence (patients’ semantic mem-
ory status, theoretical modeling, and non-
patient empirical work), the differences we
observed in patients’ ability to update trait
self-knowledge seem most parsimoniously
attributable to differences in the status of
their semantic memory–not to differential
access to UMEEs.
Non-the-less, the empirical and the-
oretical considerations presented cannot
conclusively rule out a role for UMMEs in
the formation of the semantic trait sum-
maries that are stored and later accessed
during the trait judgment process. The
possibility that the formation of the
semantic knowledge on which trait judg-
ments subsequently are based may be
due, in part, to unconscious mental activ-
ity is something which currently available
methodologies cannot definitively address.
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